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RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE 
SOCIETY OF TODAY 
ITHERTO in the development of social control, and of H that  highly specialized form of social control in civilized 
society which we call law, there have been three guiding 
influences, religion, philosophy, and the analogy of physical 
nature. We have seen that in the emergence of ordered 
society, of a legal order, from the chaos of the earlier Middle 
Ages, religion was the guiding and organizing agency of 
social control. We have seen how after the Reformation 
religion guided what might else have been a recurrence of 
anarchy in England and gave direction and stability to  the 
making of the common law of the English-speaking world in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If there were 
time, one might show also how the religious revival of the 
counter-Reformation on the Continent had a like effect upon 
the beginnings of modern juristic theory of that  part of the 
world as it developed down to  the nineteenth century, and 
especially upon the beginnings of international law. Today, 
in what seems to  be the beginning of another era in legal 
development, and, as one must hope, a new era of expansion 
and liberalization, we lack each of the guiding and steadying 
forces which had operated a t  turning points in legal history 
in the past. Yet the need of such forces is manifest. There 
is restiveness under law in every part of the world and every- 
where we may see the spread of ideas of social control by 
force, and resting solely on force, as the inevitable reality. 
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Something of what religion has done has been told. As to  
philosophy, we need only refer to the Stoic philosophy in the 
development of the Roman law from the first to the middle of 
the third century, t o  scholastic philosophy from the twelfth 
to  the fifteenth century, t o  rationalist philosophy in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, t o  metaphysical and 
later positivist philosophy in connection with historical juris- 
prudence, and utilitarianism in connection with analytical 
jurisprudence in the nineteenth century. Each of these phi- 
losophies in its turn helped in reasoned development of 
experience crystallized by authority. 
If philosophy from the twelfth to  the sixteenth century, 
and largely to  the nineteenth century, worked as the hand- 
maid of religion, the analogy of physical nature gave aid and 
comfort t o  philosophy of social control down to  the present 
century. From the time when Greek philosophers, seeking a 
way out from the strife of parties in the Greek city-state, 
from the perennial struggle of oligarchy and democracy, 
began to inquire as t o  an assured basis of social control, 
resting on reason rather than on force, men have turned to 
the phenomena of physical nature for analogies and ideals. 
They have found in the periodical return of the seasons, the 
phases of the moon, the regular succession of day and night, 
and later, as knowledge grew, in the movements of the 
planets, a model of orderly, predictable phenomena, in con- 
trast with the wilfulness, caprice, and instability of human 
conduct, especially as such conduct was manifest in political 
activity in the Greek city-state. A moral and a legal order 
were conceived of on this model, so as to bring about a like 
predictability in conduct and uniformity in the exercise of 
force by those who controlled politically organized society. 
The Greeks were travelers and traders. Going from city to 
city and from land to land, they saw that the uniformity and 
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regularity and predictability of physical nature were by no 
means reflected in the phenomena of human nature. Where 
the one seemed to  follow a plan, the other varied from action 
to  action and situation to  situation. Moreover, the means 
by which men sought t o  control or order conduct and put 
restraints upon the wilfulness of human nature were seen t o  
vary with men and places and times, whereas physical phe- 
nomena remained constant. As i t  was put in a dialogue 
attributed t o  Plato, laws and customs and political arrange- 
ments differ from land to  land, from city t o  city in the same 
land, and from time to  time in the same city. But fire burns 
and water flows, and the sun rises and sets in Persia and 
Greece and Carthage with the same regularity and pre- 
dictability. 
As men thought about these things, an ideal supernatural 
order, reflected in the order of physical nature seemed to  be 
reflected also in the moral order. There was an obvious 
contrast between the conduct of the upright, God-fearing 
man, who conformed his life t o  the pattern of the divine 
organization of external nature, and the irregular, incon- 
sistent, unpredictable conduct of the unrighteous man. We 
say of the one that  he is reliable and trustworthy. We know 
today what he will do and what he will not do tomorrow. 
We can trust him to  be constant and his conduct t o  be predic- 
table. We say of the other that  he is unprincipled, unreliable, 
untrustworthy. He does not mould his conduct t o  principles 
according to  the divine plan. He may or may not be constant 
in domestic or political or business relations. Thus there 
seemed to  be plan and system in the moral order no less than 
in the natural order. What social control by the force of 
politically organized society sought to bring about in the 
conduct of the citizen, the moral order brought about in the 
good man. Moreover, the control in each case seemed com- 
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parable t o  that control of the physical universe which was 
apparent in the everyday phenomena of the heavenly bodies. 
The moral order no less than the physical order pointed to  
principles of regularity and reasoned systematization of con- 
duct which therefore ought t o  govern the political and the 
legal orders. Thus philosophers got the conception of a nat- 
ural law, tha t  is, an ideal social control conforming to  the 
ideal regularity and uniformity and predictability which 
characterize physical nature, and of a moral order likewise 
thought of on the analogy of physical nature. The order of 
nature and the moral order pointed out the ideal t o  which the 
conduct of the citizen and the operations of those who wielded 
the authority of the city-state sought t o  conform. 
With the growth of knowledge, mathematics seemed t o  
confirm what philosophers had worked out on the basis of 
physics. I n  mathematics there was an orderly sequence of 
propositions from axioms and postulates. There was a con- 
trol of the concrete through formulas given by reasoning 
about the abstract. The analogy suggested that  what was 
applicable to  measurement of physical magnitudes and dis- 
tances and spaces was also applicable to  the measurement of 
conduct. Besides, the mathematical formula was capable of 
logical development, making i t  applicable to new states of 
fact. By analogy it seemed that  a system of moral legal 
precepts might be worked out as deductions from postulated 
ideal principles of universal application, and that the de- 
duced precepts could be systematized in a body of logically 
interdependent propositions after the pattern of geometry. 
Thus Greek philosophical speculation about social control 
gave us the idea of natural law and of a systematic positive 
law developed logically from natural law. These ideas gov- 
erned in the science of politics and in the science of law for 
centuries and have by no means lost their hold even today. 
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Both of these analogies, the analogy of the predictable 
operations of physical nature and the analogy of axioms and 
postulates developed after the manner of geometry, have 
done great things in the evolution of politics and law. Nat- 
ural law had a great part in the creation of the classical 
Roman law, in the founding of international law, in the 
general liberalizing of the strict law of the Middle Ages in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in the shaping of 
an American common law in the nineteenth century. I n  
politics i t  gave us the Declaration of Independence, the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the general 
theory of our Bills of Rights and of the decisions applying 
them. Also the idea of a logically systematized body of legal 
precepts was the basis of the analytical political theory and 
analytical jurisprudence which prevailed in the English- 
speaking world in the nineteenth century and is still strong 
everywhere. 
Thus during the whole development of modern law an 
ideal plan of universal validity, discovered by reason and 
declared in its details by authority, was the starting point of 
political and juristic theory. Resting at  first on theology, it 
was later bolstered up by philosophy. When the Protestant 
jurists of the Reformation asserted it could stand upon its 
own feet as a philosophical doctrine, none the less theology 
was regularly invoked as a support for two centuries t o  come. 
When the theological prop was given up in the last century, 
philosophy still found support in the positivist doctrine of 
reality in laws of external nature discovered by observation 
and verified by further observation, 
At  the end of the eighteenth century Kant undermined the 
rationalist natural law and set up a metaphysical politics and 
jurisprudence in its stead. The  conscious ego was taken to  be 
an unchallengeable starting point and liberty was a corollary. 
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Natural rights were deduced from liberty and natural law 
was an ideal body of precepts securing natural rights. Nat- 
ural rights were taken to be the foundation of the science of 
politics and of the science of law. But today psychology has 
challenged the unchallengeable and undermined both meta- 
physics and reason. The  theological foundation was given up 
long ago. The philosophical foundation, as it stood in the 
nineteenth century, has been shaken. Politics and jurispru- 
dence have been driven to  find new foundations or t o  rest 
insecurely upon no foundation. 
There have always been philosophers to  assert that  there 
is nothing more than power and force behind social control 
by politically organized society. It was a stock doctrine of 
the Sophists that  the just was such only by convention and 
enactment. There was no ideal behind a legal precept which 
it sought to  declare. What men had taken to  be an ideal 
behind it was a result of the existence of the precept by con- 
vention or enactment. A Marxian economic determinist or a 
skeptical realist of today might have said what is attributed 
to  Thrasymachus-that ‘khe just is nothing else than the 
self interest of the stronger,” meaning by “the stronger” the 
ruling person or persons in the city-state, and that  as the 
shepherd exploits the sheep, so the ruler exploits the ruled 
for his own advantage. Such ideas, however, did not get 
much hold until the present century. Until recently natural 
law, Roman law, theological ethics, and metaphysical nat- 
ural rights were thoroughly intrenched. 
What  I have been in the habit of calling “give-it-up phi- 
losophies,” widely taught today, have joined with attempts 
to  make over the social sciences to the pattern of the physical 
sciences, and, with a changed conception of physics, t o  put 
the social sciences wholly a t  large. 
Elimination of the idea of “ought” from jurisprudence and 
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politics got much of its impetus from economic determinism. 
When Marx announced his economic interpretation of his- 
tory in 1859, history was thought of as a record of the unfold- 
ing of an idea in human experience. The idea had been 
assumed to  be an ethical or a political idea. Marx argued 
tha t  i t  was an economic idea, an idea of satisfying material 
wants. Coming into vogue a t  the end of the nineteenth 
century, this interpretation, as an interpretation of legal his- 
tory, spread to  the science of law in the present century and 
is now active in all the social sciences. Since the World War 
it has combined with Freudian psychology and with relativ- 
ism to  form a school of realists, as they call themselves, who 
are skeptical of everything except their own skepticism and 
the economic interpretation. Marx’s economic interpreta- 
tion is applied to  every item of social control and every 
problem of politics and jurisprudence. Thus the idea of 
“ought” as an ideal unfolding or realizing itself in the his- 
torical development of legal and political institutions is 
eliminated. In  the meantime Freud’s psychology, with its 
doctrine of the wish as the determinant of action, eliminated 
reason as the means of ascertaining the content of “ought.” 
The fashionable doctrine of the moment is t ha t  what one 
wishes determines his view of what ought t o  be and what he 
wishes is determined by the self-interest of the social and 
economic class in which he finds himself. 
Neo-Kantian relativism, which for a generation has been 
the prevailing political and legal philosophy in Continental 
Europe and has recently been acquiring a foothold in Eng- 
land, reinforces the tendencies tha t  come from Marx and 
from Freud. Our fundamental problem in politics, in juris- 
prudence, and in ethics is t o  find and apply a measure of 
values. I n  jurisprudence we seek a measure of values by 
which to  know what claims or demands are to  be recognized, 
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within what limits effect ought t o  be given to  them when 
recognized, and how to secure them within the determined 
limits consistently with the securing of other recognized and 
delimited interests. Neo-Kantian relativism tells us that our 
quest of such a measure of values is futile. We can never 
find one upon which we can rely. Judgments of value are 
of necessity relative and cannot be proved. Moreover, i t  
teaches that  the relation of law and morals is one of conflicts 
and irreducible antinomies. Three ideas, justice, that  is the 
ideal relation among men, morals, that  is, the ideal man, and 
security, that  is the upholding of a legal and political order, 
contradict each other. They cannot be reconciled and no one 
of them can be proved to  have more value than another. 
There is no way of arriving a t  a satisfactory answer to  the 
question, What gives binding force to  the law? What then is 
left? The religious foundation was rejected long ago. Phi- 
losophy gives up. Perhaps we can go back to the method of 
the first Greek philosophers and take our stand upon physics? 
Nothing has been so upsetting to  political and juristic 
thinking as the rise of the idea of contingency in physics. 
The idea of law had been fashioned to  one of inevitable 
sequence of cause and effect and inevitable conformity to  a 
fixed plan in all the operations of physical nature. The 
physicist of the past rejected chance as the jurist of the past 
rejected caprice and unreasoned exercise of force. Now that  
physicists talk of chance and of jumps and breaks in natural 
phenomena, instead of the orderly sequence of cause and 
effect and the inexorably operating laws of nature, which had 
been assumed in nineteenth-century physics, the effect upon 
the social sciences has been bewildering, if not destructive. 
There seems to be nothing left but force. We start with a 
politically organized society as something given us. Here, a t  
any rate, is a starting point we may accept because it is 
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existent, and in that sense is real. One who finds himself 
starting from this actually existing phenomenon of a func- 
tioning political organization of society, will today call him- 
self a realist and dub those of us who can see no reality in his 
conception of laws as mere threats of force, superstitious 
adherents of discarded mythology. He proclaims as reality 
tha t  there is nothing more to  politics or jurisprudence than 
force and threats. T o  use a fashionable phrase of the time, 
force and threats are “brute facts,” since to  our realists bru- 
tality is a measure of actuality and a voucher of the real. 
Law had been something restraining force and constrain- 
ing application of it in an orderly, reasoned fashion toward 
ends of civilization. Now it is taken to  be simply the appli- 
cation of force toward personal ends or ends of a dominant 
social class. There is no need of bothering ourselves about 
such academic and unprofitable questions as whether law 
derives its binding force from consent or from being deducible 
directly from justice. The  argument for one is no better than 
that  for the other, and neither can be proved as against an 
argument that law has binding force because it is commanded 
by a force imposing itself upon all other forces. Law is what- 
ever is done officially. When we look a t  the phenomena of 
social and political life objectively, with no attempt a t  im- 
possible valuings, we see struggle of power with power and 
exploitation of those with less power by those with more. 
As a process, law is whatever officials do. As something in 
the books, it is a body of threats t o  be enforced or not so far 
as those who wield the force of politically organized society 
are inclined to enforce them. 
Whether or not reality is to be found in such teachings, a 
very real result of them is t o  be seen in a revival of absolut- 
ism throughout the world. We have seen three great Euro- 
pean powers turn from representative parliamentary institu- 
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tions t o  avowed dictatorships and the polity of more than 
one country, which in form hews t o  parliamentary rule, take 
on the substance of personal rule above and behind it. The 
books on government today are full of theories which, when 
carried out, lead to  organization of society in an omnicom- 
petent state in which the individual man is submerged. So, 
too, in juristic theory, ideas of liberty and balance and rights 
are rejected. The  most widely known teacher, with the 
largest following on the Continent, while free to  teach there, 
taught an absolutist theory of law on a basis of philosophical 
relativism. I n  England, where the doctrine of the supremacy 
of the law originated, a professor is now teaching that  the 
law which recognized private rights and guaranteed indi- 
vidual liberties is being swallowed up by a law which knows 
them not, and that  the old law of England, which taught that  
the King was t o  rule under God and the law, must give way 
t o  a new type of law which subordinates individual rights 
and liberties t o  the claims of officials. 
Not  the least striking effect of recent modes of thought in 
action a t  the moment may be seen in international relations 
and the breakdown of international law. Here we are cer- 
tainly, as things are today, in the realm of “brute fact.” 
Political phenomenalism holds that there is nothing beyond 
or behind the phenomena of government. They are all t ha t  
we have to  do with. There is nothing more t o  them than 
their own phenomenality. What  governments do, whether 
a t  home or abroad, is a matter of items of behavior which 
are all equally significant and equally insignificant. Each 
item is valid in and of itself as a phenomenon. Law in any 
other sense than the sum of what is done officially is futile 
because i t  seeks t o  systematize and to value the items of 
governmental action which are valid and self-sufficient with- 
out regard t o  any system, and no objective valuing is pos- 
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sible. Whatever those who wield the power of politically 
organized society succeed in doing is its own justification. 
It is a self-sufficient phenomenon. 
It is not hard to  see how such an attitude toward law and 
government grows out of the attempt of this time to  make 
every branch of learning a science to  the pattern of the 
physical sciences. At one time every branch of learning 
sought t o  be a philosophy. T o  Descartes and Newton phys- 
ics was natural philosophy. Psychology not long ago was 
mental philosophy and ethics was moral philosophy. To 
Lord Brougham a century ago what we now speak of as the 
science of government was political philosophy. When 
Austin wrote a book on analytical jurisprudence from which 
he rigidly excluded all ideal element, he called it the philos- 
ophy of law. But fashions change, and so much have our 
imaginations been taken captive by the great achievements 
of mechanical invention on the basis of physical sciences in 
the last generation, that  we are now as eager t o  call every- 
thing a science as we were formerly to  call everything a 
philosophy. Nor is it a mere matter of a name. The urge 
to  make everything that  is called a science conform in its 
method to  experimental physical science has had the effect 
of eliminating from the social sciences their fundamental 
problem. The physical sciences, we may admit, have for 
their function to discover and explain what is. The social 
sciences, on the other hand, have for their function to  dis- 
cover what ought to be and how to  bring it about. If newly 
observed phenomena do not accord with the physicist’s hypo- 
thesis, he must reject the hypothesis and frame a new one. 
It is out of the question t o  ascribe praise or blame to  the 
phenomena of physical nature. We must accept them as 
they happen. We might feel that  the revolution of the earth 
round the sun could be better arranged, and the phases of 
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the moon better adjusted to that revolution, if we could have 
months of exactly four weeks of seven days each and exactly 
twelve such months in a year. But we achieve nothing by 
criticizing the physical make-up of the universe on that basis. 
It does not follow, however, that  all criticism of the phe- 
nomena of human behavior is futile. We hear frequently 
that all value judgments are subjective, whereas science is 
objective. Hence, it is argued, we must accept phenomena 
of every sort as they come and not indulge in unscientific 
value judgments. But such judgments are the business of 
the social sciences. If particular facts of human conduct do 
not accord with some formula of justice or politics or law, 
the difficulty may lie in those facts rather than in the for- 
mula. Conduct must be shaped to what ought t o  be, not 
formulas of what-ought-to-be shaped to  facts of conduct 
which contravene the jural postulates of civilization. If 
what-ought-to-be has no place in the physical sciences, it has 
first place in the social sciences. 
What does recent philosophy offer us in place of the regime 
of social control through the orderly application of the force 
of politically organized society, conforming to  the jural pos- 
tulates of the civilization of the time and place, under which 
we were brought u p ?  In  the last century we should have 
thought of philosophical anarchy, the doctrine that law and 
government are necessary evils, t o  be held down to  the very 
minimum necessary to safeguard a few paramount social 
interests, and that for the rest we should leave everything 
t o  a regime of free contractual self-determination, leaving i t  
t o  everyone and his neighbor at  the crisis of controversy to  
determine freely by contract for what each should be liable. 
But there is nothing in the circumstances of life today to 
make i t  likely that such a regime of adjusting relations and 
ordering conduct is practicable. It presupposes that prom- 
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ises, because of an inherent morally binding force, will there- 
fore enforce themselves. If there were nothing else to give 
us pause, the circumstance that  the young realists of today 
pronounce a promise nothing more than a prediction of 
intention and ability to perform a t  maturity, indicates cau- 
tion in accepting a substitute for the legal order built on a 
theory of the sanctity and inviolability of promises. 
The  substitute for the legal order chiefly urged today is 
administrative absolutism, the committing of the adjustment 
of relations and ordering of conduct to the unfettered discre- 
tion of administrative boards or bureaus or officials, tied 
down by no rules and subject t o  no review unless that  of a 
superior in a bureaucratic hierarchy. Judges proceeding 
according to  law by applying an authoritative technique to  
authoritative guides to  decision are to  be superseded by 
“decision-makers” trained in the “technicalities of factual 
problems.” Thus there would be in each state a homicide 
commission composed of detectives from which there would 
be no appeal. The person who was pointed out by the col- 
lective hunch of these detectives as guilty would be executed 
then and there and that  would be the end of the matter. 
I n  the same spirit it has been proposed tha t  instead of the 
three departments of government established in all American 
constitutions since those first set up a t  the time of the 
Declaration of Independence, we should have four: the legis- 
lative, the judicial, the executive, and the administrative. 
I n  this polity the administrative department is to be inde- 
pendent of and coordinate with the other three, but is t o  have 
a complete rule-making, executing, and adjudicating au- 
thority along with its guiding or directing jurisdiction. Under 
such a plan, the administrative department, with no check 
upon it  and no review of its action, and with regulative power 
over every relation and every activity, could exercise an 
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unrestrained will t o  power superseding every other agency of 
politically organized society. I t  is significant that  ideas of 
this sort are being urged in all countries today. 
Where do such ideas come from in a world in which the 
last of the Caesars had fallen and absolute rule had been 
supposed to  be obsolete? The chief point of origin is Marx’s 
doctrine of the disappearance of law. Marx considered that 
law was something necessitated by a regime of private prop- 
erty and consequent regime of acquisition by exchange and 
commerce, and that  i t  had for its function t o  keep down one 
class in the interest of another, whose self-interest was identi- 
fied by it with right and justice, and imposed upon the one by 
the superior social and economic power of the other. Hence, 
he argued, in a society without property, which therefore 
would be a classless society, there would be no need for law 
and it would disappear. Yet manifestly all the causes of 
controversy in the world are not economic. There are many 
serious wrongs inflicted every day which have no connection 
with property, and many causes of quarrel are not economic. 
But  Marx’s followers have thought these too simple to  call 
for justice according to  law and have thought a group of 
experts could be provided to  settle such disputes summarily 
or on such investigations as seemed best t o  them, treating 
each case as unique and making no attempt to  find or estab- 
lish any rules or general principles. As the late economic- 
juristic adviser t o  the government of Soviet Russia put it, in 
the ideal society there will be no law, or rather only one rule 
of law, namely, that  there are no laws, but only adminis- 
trative ordinances and orders. So said Professor Pashukanis 
of Moscow a t  the height of Soviet trying-out of theoretical 
Marxism. But when later the government passed into a 
personal dictatorship and had a plan to carry out, the regime 
of administrative orders on no system proved inconvenient. 
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Then it was discovered tha t  Professor Pashukanis had made 
a mistake of interpretation. There was a purge and the 
Professor is no longer with us. Perhaps if there had been law 
instead of only administrative orders he might have lost 
nothing more than his job. 
Administrative absolutism assumes an ideal civil service, 
organized under an ideal superman chief administrator, with 
an ideal super-superman as leader of the people. There is 
nothing in human experience t o  lead us to  suppose such a 
regime possible of realization. No autocrat or headman or 
leader of an absolute administrative bureaucracy in history 
ever proved equal t o  what administrative absolutism assumes 
in the way of ex ojicio omniscience and omnicompetence. 
What  history does show us abundantly, however, is t ha t  
whatever such a regime may lack in other respects, it is never 
lacking in will t o  power. Given power with no check upon it, 
a regime of that  sort will not hesitate t o  use the power for 
its own sake. At any rate it will prove efficient in maintain- 
ing itself by force, and it will think of itself as a regime of 
force rather than as one of reason. 
Of the several types of political and juristic thought which 
describe themselves as realist and lay claim to  realism, the 
most significant are economic determinism, psychological 
realism, skeptical relativist realism, and phenomenalism. I 
have said something about each of these in another connec- 
tion. Let us recall that  economic determinism refers every 
item of the judicial and afort iori  of the administrative proc- 
ess t o  class self-interest of the dominant social and economic 
class, of which judge or court or official is but the mouth- 
piece. Psychological realism holds tha t  in the nature of 
things it is impossible for a judge or court or tribunal to make 
an objective, impartial decision or t o  reach a decision to  the 
measure of a predetermined legal precept. Inevitably the 
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decision will be the product of individual psychology and 
subconscious wishes or prejudices, more or less skilfully 
covered up, i t  may be, by specious legal reasoning. It denies 
the possibility of what we had believed we had been doing, 
since a t  least the time of Cicero, namely, control the action 
of those who decide controversies by the authority of polit- 
ically organized society by requiring application of an author- 
itative technique to authoritative precepts as guides to  a 
predictable result. It  conceives that general propositions 
as grounds of decision are either delusion or wilful deception, 
Skeptical relativist realism combines economic determinism 
and psychological realism by a relativist doctrine that no 
one can ever demonstrate any measure of values or criterion 
of ought-to-be, since such things are only subjective mental 
creations. One man’s is as good and as valid as another’s 
and to  appeal from one tribunal to another is only t o  sub- 
stitute one arbitrary result for another no more and no less 
arbitrary. Hence it has been proposed that an honest statute 
as to homicide should read, “when a court . . . finds that 
one person has killed another person and believes that the 
killer deserves to be electrocuted, the court may order that  
he be electrocuted.” But why trouble about a finding that 
the one killed the other? Why not let it read: “When the 
public safety commission arrives in any manner it pleases 
at  the conclusion that some person should be electrocuted, 
it may make an order accordingly.” That  is the method of 
the purge under an omnicompetent leader and why stop 
short of i t ?  
Lord Coke tells us that the Star Chamber “kept all Eng- 
land in quiet.” The skeptical realists, with a surprising 
faith after so much refusal to  admit what experience had 
seemed to  show for centuries, look forward to a similar 
keeping of society in quiet by “men trained and qualified 
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in the efficient and wise administration of government 
affairs.” Very likely they mean to  substitute professors 
acting as administrative officials for lawyers acting as judges. 
If they do and they some day have their way, I venture to 
predict that  the attempt to  keep all America in quiet in t ha t  
way will end as did the attempt to  keep England in quiet 
by means of the Star Chamber. At any rate the skeptical 
realist is for out and out absolutism in decision and adminis- 
tration as the only possible method of adjusting relations 
and ordering conduct, which therefore we should honestly 
admit, and give over all hollow pretence of law and rights 
and constitutional guarantees and authoritative technique. 
As to phenomenalism, it will be enough t o  describe briefly 
a recent book on ethics from the phenomenalist standpoint. 
The burden of the book is that  the nineteenth-century ethics 
was “legalistic.” It thought in terms of principles of morals 
and moral laws. There are no such things. We must divorce 
ethics completely from an idea of laws or rules, and, if we 
are to  be scientific, we must give over all criticism in terms 
of good and bad. We have t o  do only with items of behavior. 
Conduct is made up of behavior phenomena, and these are 
to  be studied simply as phenomena. Scientifically there is 
no such thing as “ought t o  happen.” “Ought,” we are told, 
is a word which belongs to  individual systems of thought and 
has no absolute validity. 
Such modes of thought are obviously adapted to  autoc- 
racies and dictatorships. If an autocracy or a dictatorship 
can secure satisfaction of the material wants of enough of 
the population to  keep it in power, it meets the requirements 
of relativist realism. Institutionalism would say tha t  the 
polity of a given society is an institution and so must be 
accepted as the phenomenalist would accept a phenomenon 
or as the calendar maker must accept the phases of the 
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moon. So autocracy and dictatorship in their institutional 
capacity justify themselves. Moreover, the items of action 
of autocrats and dictators are behavior phenomena not to  
be tried by rules or laws of morals. 
Autocrats and dictators cannot attend personally to  all 
the  details of government. They must carry on their rule 
through bureaus and boards and administrative agencies. 
Hence the idea of law is superseded by an idea of unchecked 
administration, and that  idea is backed up by all the give- 
it-up philosophies of the time. Skeptical realism tells the 
administrative official that  as a matter of psychology neither 
he nor anyone else can reach an objective determination. 
Skeptical relativism adds that  value judgments are purely 
subjective, so the bureau official may legitimately put his 
own value on his individual hunch. What he does will be 
determined by his individual temperament and prejudices 
and surroundings. So there is no use in trying t o  guide 
administrative action by such illusory things as rules or 
principles of law or moral judgments, or anything but the 
will of his administrative superiors. Phenomenalism tells 
him that  what a bureau or commission or administrative 
official does in any particular case is a phenomenon and must 
be treated as such. It stands independent of all other 
phenomena. Very likely he will understand institutionalism 
to  tell him that  each administrative bureau is an institution 
and as such justifies itself. What i t  does is for itself to  judge 
of, and subjection of its action to  judicial scrutiny is an 
impertinence standing in the way of efficiency. The  effect 
of these modes of thought, which have become widespread 
in the teaching of politics and have been coming into law 
teaching, is t o  be seen in an increasing vogue of adminis- 
trative absolutism in the English-speaking world of today. 
I n  consequence a contest is going on between courts and 
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administrative bureaus wherever the English common law 
prevails. Two maxims which, as the lawyer sees it, are 
involved in the very idea of justice, are continually invoked 
by the courts. One is t ha t  no one is t o  be judge in his own 
case. The other is that  both parties must be heard. The 
courts have steadfastly enforced these propositions against 
the tendency of bureaus and administrative boards t o  ignore 
both of them in the interest of efficiency. Such things, in- 
deed, are defended by many and legislation is pressed to  
prevent correction of them by the courts. We must remem- 
ber that  for realist modes of thought there are no such things 
as rights and for administrative absolutism there is no such 
thing as law. There are only administrative orders, made 
for each case, treated as a unique case, independent of all 
others. 
Much of the vogue of such teaching comes from the sug- 
gestion in the terms “realist” and “realism,” which convey 
an impression of exclusive contact with the facts of the 
world as compared with ideals and idealistic theories which 
are in the clouds. But “real” and “realist” and “realism,” 
as applied to  the American juristic left, are a boast, not a 
description. The advocates of this self-styled realism are 
fond of applying to  the doctrines they reject such epithets 
as superstition and myth and pious fraud, and some go so 
far as t o  pronounce the law a “racket” and the profession, 
trained in the tradition of search for principle and quest of 
patterns of objective decision, dishonest. They are not the 
first proponents of new theories, however, t o  claim a monop- 
oly of truth and contact with reality. These things have been 
claimed in full and exclusive ownership by every new school 
of jurists which has arisen since the Middle Ages. 
Legal realism so-called is realism in the artistic, not in a 
philosophical, sense. Like artistic realism it  is a cult of the 
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ugly. The realist in art says the ugly exists in nature, hence 
it is not true to  nature to  paint the beautiful, as in classical 
art. Truth requires one to  paint the ugly. Keats’s lines: 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty, that  is all 
You know and all you need to know 
ignore that  the ugly is true also. But it does not follow that 
we should say, ugliness is truth, truth ugliness, that  is all. 
The ugly is real in the sense that  the ugly exists. But it 
does not follow that  the real is ugly. When we put it in that  
way, we put the ugly as the significant element in reality. 
The  ugly exists therefore the ugly is significant, is not a 
necessary conclusion. That  there are ugly features in social 
control by the force of politically organized society is no 
sudden discovery of the juristic realists. For twenty-three 
hundred years, since Greek philosophers began to  think and 
write on the subject, men have been a t  work finding out 
how to control these ugly features and make the adjustment 
of human relations and ordering of human conduct by law 
an objective and reasoned process conforming to  the postu- 
lates of civilized life. Long before them another great people 
had given us a religious literature in which the principles of 
the moral life had been made clear in their relation to the 
Eternal who makes for righteousness. This age is remarkable 
for its mechanical development. But i t  makes the mistake 
of supposing that  mechanical development is self-sufficient. 
Our control over external nature which has harnessed its 
forces to  man’s use was made possible by the control of in- 
ternal nature by religion and morals and law which had har- 
nessed human nature to  make it a servant of civilization. 
It is this control over internal nature which has made 
division of labor possible, which has made investigation and 
research and experiment possible, which has set men free 
to  develop human powers to  their highest unfolding. With- 
Religion and Social Control 171 
out this control of internal nature the control of external 
nature is its own undoing, as we may see all about us in 
a regime of destructive activity tha t  threatens return to  the 
chaos and anarchy of the earlier Middle Ages. 
Our social science should build on the achievements of 
social control, not on its failures; and the achievements are 
nothing less than the whole of civilization. We shall not 
make them greater by a give-it-up philosophy nor by reject- 
ing the three agencies which have operated to  bring about 
those achievements because they do not reach a hundred 
per cent efficiency. Unchecked power, even directed by 
good intentions, has been tried over and again in the history 
of mankind. But the skeptical realist, rejecting history, has 
developed a faith that  a benevolent superman despot guided 
by professors will be able t o  do what Plato expected from 
the philosopher king. 
At other crises in political and legal history law has been 
put in the path of progress by a religious revival which has 
made philosophy vital and morals a force for justice. If 
philosophy gives up and morals throughout the world are 
inert, may we expect law to develop unaided the conception 
of justice and adjust itself unaided to that  conception, or 
must we pronounce all that  has been gained in the control of 
human nature since the twelfth century a failure and resort 
t o  anarchy for a new start by way of absolute government? 
There is nothing in human experience to compel either con- 
clusion. Our mechanical development, with a mouth speak- 
ing great things, has taken itself t o  be self-sufficient. We have 
deified it, forgetting the long development of morals and law 
upon a background of religion which went before it and up- 
holds it. A religious revival such as tha t  which built cathe- 
drals and churches to  the glory of God rather than as business 
undertakings over all Europe in the twelfth century and 
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after, such as in the seventeenth century sent companies 
of God-fearing people into the wilderness to  found a new 
world on the basis of free worship of God and free exercise 
of their faculties as moral units before God-such a revival 
i s  due to rebuild a moral order, t o  put new life in philosophy, 
to  make morals and philosophy live in the ordering of con- 
duct and adjustment of relations, not by sheer force, but 
by force applied according to law. 
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